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VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
have even given the defendant the right of pre-trial discovery 14 which is
not required by due process.15 There is no valid reason why the prose-
cution should not be given access to evidence which can shed light
on issues in the case if no rights or privileges which are guaranteed
by law to the defendant are involved.16 In such a way, justice can be
attained in most cases where surprise has traditionally worked against the
prosecution and enabled a guilty defendant to escape unscathed. The courts
which might adopt such a procedure, as California has done, will not be
sacrificing constitutional principles or impinging constitutional safeguards,
but merely taking immense strides toward more enlightened criminal
procedure. It will be interesting to see how many states, by legislative
or judicial action, will respond to the compelling force of this decision.
James F. Kipp
DOMESTIC RELATIONS-STATE HAS POWER TO ORDER MEDICAL
TREATMENT FOR CHILD IN SPITE OF PARENTS' RELIGIOUS OBJECTIONS.
State v. Perricone (N.J. 1962).
Appellants were Jehovah's Witnesses who refused to permit a blood
transfusion to be performed upon their child.' The superintendent of the
hospital in which the child was a patient brought an action under the New
Jersey "neglect statute' 2 to have the parents declared in neglect of the
child and to have himself appointed guardian of the child for the purpose of
14. See supra note 1.
15. Campbell v. United States, 365 U.S. 85, 81 S. Ct. 321 (1961); Palermo v.
United States, 360 U.S. 343, 79 S. Ct. 1217 (1959).
16. Justice Peters, dissenting in the instant case, agrees in principle with this
contention:
While of course, a criminal trial should be 'fair' to the prosecution as well as
the defense, it should not be forgotten that the defendant has additional constitu-
tional and statutory rights not given to the prosecution. 22 Cal. Rptr. 879, 884
(1962).
1. The refusal was based on the religious belief that to permit oneself or to
permit another to be subjected to a blood transfusion is comparable to "eating blood."
Members of the Jehovah's Witnesses' sect have interpreted certain passages of the
Bible as prohibiting such practice.
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-9 (1960).
When the parents of any minor child or the parent or other person having
actual care and custody of any minor child are grossly immoral or unfit to be
entrusted with the care and education of such child, or shall neglect to provide
the child with proper protection, maintenance and education . . . it shall be
lawful for any person interested in the welfare of such child to institute an
action for the purpose of having the child brought before the court, and for
further relief.
Such neglect statutes, now common throughout the country, confer upon the
Children's Courts or Juvenile Courts a power which had been historically exer-
cised by the Chancery Courts. Petition of Ferrier, 103 I11. 367, 371-372 (1882). This
power of "parens patriae," as it is generally known, was defined by the court in Johnson
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consenting to the transfusion. The parents' defense was that of freedom of
religion and conscience. Upon finding that the child might die shortly if
no transfusion were allowed, the trial court held the parents in neglect and
issued an order appointing the hospital superintendent as the child's
guardian for the sole purpose of consenting to the blood transfusion.
While an appeal was pending, the Supreme Court of New Jersey certified
the matter on its own motion and affirmed the judgment of the trial court,
holding that a parent who refuses to consent to a blood transfusion for his
child in danger of death is guilty of neglect. State v. Perricone, 37 N.J.
463, 181 A.2d 751 (1962).
Parents have the primary duty and right to guide and control their
children,3 but this right is not beyond limitation even when its contra-
diction would impair the religious principles of the family ;4 neither the
rights of parenthood nor religion are absolute. 5 The state has not only
a right, but a duty, as parens patriae,6 to care for those citizens who can-
not care for themselves. This includes not only orphans, but also those
who, while under the supervision of others, do not receive the minimum
standards of care set by the state. The child in the present case seems to
fall within this latter category.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters,7 the Court, in striking down an
Oregon statute which required public school attendance for all children,
stated:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this
union repose excludes any general power of the states to standardize
its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public teachers
only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those who nur-
v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 430, 114 A.2d 1, 5 (1955), as "a right of sovereignity . . . [which]
imposes a duty on the sovereign to protect the public interest and protect such persons
with disabilities who have no rightful protector." This same right was enjoyed by com-
mon law courts which were empowered to take custody of the child from the parents, if
necessary, and appoint a guardian if the parents had failed in their duty or were
unfit to be entrusted with the care of the child. Wellesley v. Beaufort, 2 Russ. 1, 38
Eng. Rep. 236 (Ch. 1827), aff'd sub nora., Wellesley v. Wellesley, 1 Dow. & Cl. 152,
6 Eng. Rep. 481 (H.L. 1829). This power is now expressly provided by statute.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-2 (1952):
"It is hereby declared to be a principle governing the law of this state that
children under the jurisdiction of said courts are wards of the state, ...
entitled to the protection of the state, which may intervene to safeguard them
from the neglect or injury."
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4-34 (1952):
"Children under 18 years of age who appear before the juvenile and domestic
relations court in any capacity shall be deemed to be wards of the court, and
protected accordingly."
Cf. "[The above quoted statutes grant] this court express power to act on
behalf of the state, as parens patriae with respect to children within its juris-
diction and to protect them from neglect or injury." Hoener v. Bertinato, t,7
N.J. Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961).
3. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925).
4. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S.
333, 10 S. Ct. 299 (1890).
5. Ibid.
6. Johnson v. State, 18 N.J. 422, 114 A.2d 1 (1955).
7. 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571 (1925).
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ture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.8
It should be noted immediately, however, that while the "right" is clearly
recognized, it is "coupled with" a high duty. When this duty is violated
the state may intercede.
The test generally used in such cases to determine whether the
state should interfere is the "clear and present danger doctrine."9  It
provides that the state may not act in violation of religious liberties unless a
clear and present danger to the interests of the state is presented. In West
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,10 the Court struck down a
regulation of the Board of Education requiring all school children to recite
the Pledge of Allegiance, finding no such danger. The rule was objected to
by several parents on religious grounds. However, in Prince v. Common-
wealth of Massachusetts," the Court did find a clear and present danger.
In sustaining the conviction of a member of the Jehovah's Witnesses for
violation of a statute which prohibited using children under a certain age
in selling of newspapers on the street, the Court indicated that the test is
modified in regard to children in that the state may possess greater regu-
latory power. One reason is that what may not present a danger to adults
may constitute a great danger to children. Even though the defendant
parent claimed the selling of the newspapers was a divine command, 1 -2
the Court found that the consequential harm to the health and welfare of
the child, and thus to the interest of the state, gave the latter the power to
prohibit such practice. The Court indicated, however, that even if the
danger presented is the same for both adult and child, the state still
maintains a greater regulatory power over the child:
Parents may be free to become martyrs themselves. But it does
not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs
of their children before they have reached the age of full and legal
discretion when they can make that choice for themselves. 3
Specifically, as regards the present case, a number of decisions have
appeared dealing with parents who refused to allow others to administer
to their children. In People Ex Rel Wallace v. Labrenz, 4 the situation
was strikingly similar to that in the instant case. The parents refused to
8. Id. at 535, 45 S. Ct. at 573.
9. This test was indicated by certain language in West Virginia v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 63 S. Ct. 1178 (1943), and has been applied in innumerable cases involving a
conflict of public welfare and personal liberties.
10. Ibid.
11. 321 U.S. 158, 64 S. Ct. 438 (1944).
12. The defendant based her defense on the religious belief of the Jehovah's
Witnesses that active evangelism required by Jehovah included the selling of their
religious papers on the street.
13. Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170, 64 S. Ct. 438,
444 (1944).
14. 411 Il1. 618, 104 N.E.2d 769 (1952), cert. denied 344 U.S. 824, 73 S. Ct.
24 (1952) ; accord, Morrison v. State, 252 S.W.2d 97 (Mo. Ct. App. 1952).
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give the child a blood transfusion because of religious objections. Death
or permanent brain damage was the medical prognosis. The court appointed
a guardian for the child for the purpose of consenting to the transfu-
sion after a finding that the child was "neglected" or "dependent" as
required by the relevant statute. In Re Vasko' 5 involved a child of two
years who had glioma, a malignant disease of the eye. The medical testi-
mony was to the effect that, if proper measures were not taken, the eye
would increase in size until it protruded through the eyelid and that the
disease would follow the optic nerve to the brain eventually causing
death. The mother's only objection to the operation was that God had
given her the baby and He could do with it as He pleased. The court
allowed the operation even though it appeared that a cure was only about
fifty percent probable.
In In Re Carstairs,16 untreated mental illness was found a sufficient
basis for a finding of neglect. Other than being obese, the child was not
physically ill; however, the mother had been repeatedly informed of the
child's anti-social behavior. The court on finding neglect and ordering
psychiatric treatment of the child said:
Neglect . . . is not only a failure to provide the necessaries of life -
sustenance, clothing, shelter, food and warmth - but a failure to care,
to look after, to guide, to supervise . . . to direct the activities of a
child which will not destroy the child and will not be a menace to
others. 17
The court saw the duty of the community to be to prevent temporary acts
from becoming a permanent state of mind. Although the court felt that
the child might be a menace not only to himself, but to others, it is sub-
mitted that the court would have acted similarly on behalf of the boy
even if such a threat had not been present. The court, in In Re Seiferth,18
while deciding that the parents' objection had been "philosophical" rather
than "religious" did not direct medical treatment, but did forbid the
father of the child from interfering in conversations designed to acquaint
the latter with the advantages of the needed operation. The distinction
made here between "philosophical" and "religious" is of little consequence
since the court indicated that it could take action anyway. On the other
hand, the court in In Re Frank,19 while noting jurisdiction only on a
finding of neglect, refused to take the child from its father merely because
it had a speech defect which the father had failed to take action to cor-
rect. In In Re Hudson,20 the court found no neglect even though the
child had been born with a grotesquely enlarged arm. The arm, being
almost the size of the rest of the body, prevented the child from persuing
15. 238 App. Div. 128, 263 N.Y.S. 552 (1933).
16. 115 N.Y.S.2d 314 (1952).
17. Id. at 316.
18. 127 N.Y.S.2d 63 (Childrens Court 1954).
19. 41 Wash. 2d 294, 248 P.2d 553 (1952).
20. 13 Wash. 2d 673, 126 P.2d 765 (1942).
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normal activities and made her more susceptable to infection. However,
there would have been a serious risk of death if an amputation had been
attempted. It appears from these cases that not all courts are in com-
plete agreement regarding the scope of the state powers in this area. How-
ever, certain guide lines are suggested. The "clear and present danger"
required for state action over parental objection in these cases does not
always mean danger of death. It appears to include any condition, physical
or mental, which is serious enough to prevent the child from persuing a
relatively normal life. However, it probably must also require immediate
attention and the treatment, itself, should present a reasonable expectation
of success. If such conditions are found, the form of the parents' objec-
tion seems to be just one more aspect to be taken into consideration by the
court. Perhaps a refusal on religious grounds might be treated with
greater respect by the court; however, in all cases where a child is found to
be neglected or dependent, a religious objection alone will not impede
court action. It should be emphasized that when the court is presented
with a religious objection it may decide only if the contention is sincere,
that is, in line with the religious beliefs of the organization in which the
parent claims membership. It is not competent to decide the seriousness of
the objection. The court's function is not to weigh spiritual consequences
against physical damage. Nor can it hold in higher regard religious ob-
jections from a member of one sect than those from another. The name,
size or primitiveness of the denomination is of no concern. Each objection
must be equally weighed, with the determining factor always being the
welfare of the child. In the instant case, the objection was based on the
sincere belief of a Jehovah's Witness. The same principles would apply
if it were a Catholic complaining about a proposed abortion. If it appeared
that the operation promised a good chance of success and was necessary
to save the life of the child, there is little doubt that the court would
permit it. The deducible rule is a simple one: where the child is threatened
with severe physical or mental consequences which can be prevented by
treatment which holds a reasonable expectation of success, but which is
opposed by the parents for religious reasons, the courts will not allow the
religious objections to stand in the way of the child's welfare.
Freedom of religion is undoubtedly a great and important guarantee.
State action abridging this right must be strictly controlled. To allow the
state to step in and deny the free exercise of a person's sincere beliefs in a
divine command, would, at first glance, seem to run counter to these
principles.2 1 Closer inspection, however, of the instant case and similar
21. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), the Supreme Court of the
United States held that the right of religion was not beyond limitation. In that case, it
affirmed a conviction for polygamy which the defendant claimed was unconstitutional
in violation of his religious beliefs.
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